Aspiring to the fittest and promotion of cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game.
Strategy changes are an essential part of evolutionary games. Here, we introduce a simple rule that, depending on the value of a single parameter w , influences the selection of players that are considered as potential sources of the new strategy. For positive w players with high payoffs will be considered more likely, while for negative w the opposite holds. Setting w equal to zero returns the frequently adopted random selection of the opponent. We find that increasing the probability of adopting the strategy from the fittest player within reach, i.e., setting w positive, promotes the evolution of cooperation. The robustness of this observation is tested against different levels of uncertainty in the strategy adoption process and for different interaction networks. Since the evolution to widespread defection is tightly associated with cooperators having a lower fitness than defectors, the fact that positive values of w facilitate cooperation is quite surprising. We show that the results can be explained by means of a negative feedback effect that increases the vulnerability of defectors although initially increasing their survivability. Moreover, we demonstrate that the introduction of w effectively alters the interaction network and thus also the impact of uncertainty by strategy adoptions on the evolution of cooperation.